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According to The New York Times, two ex-CIA analysts are claiming that there is incontrovertible 
evidence that tens of thousands of Americans may have been exposed to chemical weapons before, 
during, and/or after Operation DESERT STORM. The ex-analysts also claim that authorities within the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and CIA have repeatedly discounted this evidence, hindered the analysts' 
efforts to publicize the information and inform policy, investigated one of them for compromising 
classified information, and "ruined" their careers. The counterclaims from DOD and CIA authorities posit 
that the whole matter is merely one of honest disagreement among intelligence analysts and that the 
investigation for compromising classified information is a standard response when anyone with a 
security clearance writes an unauthorized letter to a newspaper on an area in which one works. (One of 
the ex-CIA analysts admits to this.)  
 
What to believe? A political psychologist might generate a number of usual suspects, i.e., hypotheses, 
when a conspiracy is alleged. (1) The analysts are lying to seek fame and fortune or to get back at the 
US. Government for unfortunate career reversals. (2) The analysts are mentally unstable and primed to 
see conspiracy under every rock and behind every tree. (3) The analysts believe that they are right, are 
stable, are not working for fame and fortune but are wrong. (4) The analysts are right regardless of their 
motives. (5) The authorities are merely seeking to protect a formal process of intelligence analysis 
wherein there is ample room for divergent views before a formal opinion is generated, and there is a 
pressing need to protect intelligence sources. (6) This last hypothesis applies with the added fact that 
the authorities are wrong and the analysts' views on chemical warfare during the Persian Gulf War are 
correct. (7) The authorities are indeed engaging in a conspiracy to cover up politically damaging 
information. (Here the political damage may be to the US., the US. Government, or specific members of 
the government, namely themselves or their allies within the bureaucracy.) (8) There is no conspiracy 
but the disruption of business as usual fosters a number of uncoordinated impediments by various 
authorities towards the analysts. (9) There is no conspiracy, but there is a banality of evil phenomenon 
under which various authorities each for idiosyncratic reasons acts noxiously towards the analysts.  
 
There are other hypotheses, singly and in combination. Some, such as a combination of (3) and (6), may 
induce maximum conflict in which neither side will voluntarily back down and in which both sides are 
wrong about chemical warfare during the Persian Gulf War. Some of the more sinister, such as (7), may 
be usefully explicated by the same psychological models of moral judgment and behavior which have 
been applied to terrorism.  
 
These models comprise empirically validated, intrapsychic phenomena, including various defense 
mechanisms on the part of the conspirator. Rationalization of conspiracy behavior, denying the 
conspiracy is a conspiracy, projecting towards the victims of the conspiracy so that the latter seem to 
deserve it in the eyes of the conspirator, or even repressing the conspiracy's effects on the victim are 
only a few common mechanisms. A social-cognitive learning theorist might jettison the psychodynamic 
jargon and even the notion of the unconscious, a sine qua non of a defense mechanism, and posit 
psychological phenomena with similar intrapsychic and behavioral consequences. This would be similar 
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to Dollard and Miller's attempt in the 1940s to bring psychodynamic theory into the realm of learning 
theory.  
 
Meanwhile, another class of real or alleged victims encompass those who may have come into contact 
with either chemical or even biological agents during the Gulf War. They also are looking for some truth. 
Social psychological processes affecting their plight and their quest for a so-called truth-- especially 
ongoing discourses on the self, responsibility, liability, causality, and reality-- will be discussed in a future 
issue of IBPP. (See http://www.nytimes.com/96/ 10/30/gulfwar-chemical.html; Freud, A. (1966.) The 
writings of Anna Freud: Vol. 2. The ego and the mechanisms of defense. (Rev. ed.) NY: International 
Universities Press; Bandura, A. (1987.) Mechanisms of moral disengagement. Paper presented at the 
Psychology of Terrorism Interdisciplinary Conference. Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, Washington, D.C.; Dollard, J., & Miller, N. (1947.) Social learning and imitation. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. (Keywords: Conspiracy, Terrorism, Moral.) 
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